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1. Introduction 
It was not an easy task to predict the outcome of the Scottish referendum as there 
were many twists and turns en route to the final poll, which made it difficult for even 
mainstream pollsters to gauge public opinion. Even with the benefit of hindsight there 
are still many important questions yet to be answered months after the event. For 
example, did voters have enough clear information on the key issues of the 
referendum?; was there any ‘Yes’ momentum following the rejection of a currency 
union?; what roles did emotion and rationality play in the decision process of voters?  
 
It is difficult, if not indeed impossible, to project the final referendum results by 
traditional means, such as surveys, polling, etc. and the unforeseen events and 
puzzling polling results of the final month before the referendum complicated the 
forecasting task considerably. An innovative way of forecasting is needed to make 
more precise forecasts robust to uncertain situations and one which does not rely on 
snapshot polls.  
 
For example, the polling results of the last month of the referendum indicated that the 
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ votes were close. However, the ‘No’ side won the referendum with a 
comfortably wide margin. There were claims that the television debate broadcast by 
the BBC and the interventions of three main Westminster parties, especially in terms 
of ‘the Vow’, determined the referendum path and contributed to the subsequent ‘No’ 
victory. However, it is difficult to verify these claims by standard methods. 
 
In this paper we propose a new and innovative way of analysing the Scottish 
referendum using a large data set from Google and advanced econometric methods. 
We believe our research, covering the period between August 2013 and September 
2014, provides a better understanding of the salient issues in the referendum debate 
and has much wider applicability, since it could be applied to other referenda and 
standard election processes. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first provide background information on the 
referendum-related issues between August 2013 and mid-August 2014, and then, in 
Section 2, conduct an empirical analysis using an innovative information demand 
approach that projects the voting results based on weekly information available more 
than one month before the event. It is important to note that although this is an ex post 
analysis of the Scottish referendum our predictions are truly ex ante in the sense that 
they are predictions based only on information available at the time.   
 
After listing the main events between mid-August and mid-September 2014 and 
updating our projection with the new information, Section 3 provides a thorough 
analysis of daily interrelationships between voting intention and a newly constructed 
‘Yes’ indicator, and the effects of key events on the two variables. The paper ends 
with a summary of the main findings and proposals for further research. 
 
2. Big Data Analysis of the Referendum until August 2014 
2.1 The Referendum-Related Issues 
This section describes several referendum-related issues which are difficult to tackle 
by surveys or other traditional approaches. Our proposition is that we believe that 
many voters in the Scottish referendum did not obtain sufficient information about the 
referendum through traditional means. Although there was clearly plenty of coverage 
in the newspapers and on TV, what we suggest is that this did not give potential voters 
a clear information signal due to the noisiness of the data. For example, newspapers 
and TV channels might cherry-pick and provide conflicting reports on the same 
events. Even professional pollsters provided polling results with huge variations 
within a very short time span. Many voters seemed to be lost in a morass of 
information. Therefore, the first main issue facing referendum voters was whether and 
where they could get enough clear information for their decision making process. 
 
There is no doubt that the most debated referendum issue until August 2014 was that 
of currency. The polling results from several companies did show some gains on the 
‘Yes’ side after George Osborne rejected the idea of a currency union in February 
2014. Some reports claimed that the ‘Yes’ campaign had gained momentum from the 
currency debates. However, such claims remain to be verified. 
 
For many referendum voters, their decisions to vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ might depend on 
both rational factors - focusing on their well-being and that of generations to come - 
and emotional factors influenced by on-going events in Scotland and the rest of UK. 
In a year full of significant events, - e.g., rejection of a potential currency union, the 
Commonwealth Games and the Bannockburn anniversary - the effects of event-driven 
emotion should not be ignored since they seemed to play an important role in the 
referendum timetable set by the then First Minister, Alex Salmond. Meanwhile, it 
remains an issue to distinguish between emotion and rationality, and their effects on 
the decisions of voters. 
 
 
2.2 An Innovative Approach Based on Big Data Set from Google 
The traditional referendum-related research on polling results, news reports, etc., are 
essentially analyses of information supplied to voters. In this section, we propose an 
innovative approach, based on search volume measured by a Google Trends big data, 
to analyse the active information demand by referendum voters. 
 
2.2.1 Google-Related Research 
Google Trends is a service, provided by Google, to allow researchers access to the 
real-time relative online search volume for any keyword within any region of the 
world. The Google Trends data are presented in a [0, 100] interval, in either a daily or 
weekly index (Choi and Varian, 2012). The index of a particular term presents the 
percentage of search volume relative to the total search volume over time. The larger 
the index is, the higher the information demanded and searches are for this term.  
As of October 2014, Google enjoyed a 88.7% share of web search volume worldwide 
(Statista Inc., January 7, 2015). Given its dominance in the web search market, 
economic researchers in various fields have started to analyse information demand 
with the Google Trends data. 
 
For example, Da, et al. (2011) measure investor attention using the Google Trends 
data and find a positive correlation between Google Trends and other sentiment 
measures in a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. The Google Trends data are 
also strongly linked with the sentiment of less sophisticated retail investors, and an 
increase in Google search volume is correlated with a short-term momentum and 
long-term reversal in stock prices, which supports the attention theory of Barber and 
Odean (2008). 
 
Vlastakis and Markellos (2012) use the Google Trends data of the 30 largest stocks 
traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ as a proxy for information demand. They find that 
the Google Trends has significant effects on price volatility and trading volume, both 
at the individual stock level and at the overall market level. The effects become 
especially significant during the periods when the stock returns are high. Similar 
results found in the French and Japanese stock markets (Aouadi et al., 2013; Takeda 
and Wakao, 2014) indicate that the Google Trends data, a measure of information 
demand, can play an important role in predicting stock returns and price volatilities. 
 
Kita and Wang (2012) adopt the Google Trends data to measure investor information 
demand in the foreign exchange market. They find strong causal effects of 
information demand on exchange rate volatility and a positive correlation between the 
information demands and carry trade returns. 
 
Recently, Vozlyublennaia (2014) examined the Google Trends in the index markets. 
She finds that a significant short-run change in index returns is attributable to an 
increase in Google search queries. 
 
While most Google-related economic studies focus on financial markets, Fondeur and 
Karamé (2013) test whether the Google Trends can predict the claimant counts in 
France. Their results indicate that the model with Google search volume data predicts 
unemployment much better than the one without. 
 
In summary, recent studies have demonstrated that the Google trends data can help 
explain the dynamics of financial markets and make more accurate economic 
predictions. However, there is no research using Google Trends to gauge political 
information demand and make projections on voting results, which is the novelty of 
the present paper. 
 
 
2.2.2 Testing Criteria and Referendum Projection 
In order to measure the information demand of potential ‘Yes’ voters in the Scottish 
referendum, we propose using the Google search volume for the key words ‘Alex 
Salmond’ that occurred within Scotland. We choose ‘Alex Salmond’ for two reasons: 
Firstly, as the First Minister of Scotland at the time of the referendum and leader of 
Scottish National Party, the key words ‘Alex Salmond’ was the most popular choice 
when voters wanted to find information from Google on Scottish independence. 
Secondly, the search volume of ‘Alex Salmond’ was highly correlated with the polling 
and voting results of previous voting results of Scottish Parliament elections. For 
example, we find that the correlation of the search volume and polling result was 0.6 
between January and May 2011. 
 
With the available information demand data, we first set testing criteria and 
forecasting procedures before conducting our main empirical analysis. We adopt 
search volume of the key word ‘SNP’ within Scotland as the control variable in our 
models as a robustness check. 
 
(1) Testing Criteria of Clear Information 
We assume that, if referendum voters with an inclination to vote ‘Yes’ found enough 
clear information from Google, the search volume of ‘Alex Salmond’ within Scotland 
should have significant and positive effects on the polling results of ‘Yes’ votes. 
 
(2) Testing Criteria on Information-Related ‘Yes’ Momentum 
To find whether debates relating to the currency issue created ‘Yes’ momentum, we 
first test whether there was a regime change with respect to the polling results after 
February 2014 and whether the potential ‘Yes’ votes grew faster in the later regime. 
 
(3) Testing Criteria on Emotion and Rationality 
To measure the effects of emotion and rationality distinctively, we assume that 
emotion might dominate voters’ decision-making process for a while, but the effects 
are not long lasting or persistent: as in the majority of economic models over a longer 
time span, rationality is assumed to prevail. To be more specific, we set significant 
and positive effects lasting less than one week to be mainly ‘emotional’ and more than 
one week to be ‘rational’. 
 
 
(4) Referendum Projection with Big Data 
Based on available information until mid-August 2014, we provide our version of 
projections on the voting outcome of the Scottish referendum on 18 September 2014 
using the weekly search volume variable. 
 
2.3 Empirical Findings 
Our empirical analysis covers the time period between 25 August 2013 and 16 August 
2014, when the polls from most mainstream pollsters were available. Our data 
analysis involves two main variables and one control variable. The main variable, 
‘Potential Yes Votes’, is constructed by the average opinion polling results on ‘Yes’ 
votes from the six polling companies, i.e., ICM, Dipso Mori, Panel base, Survation, 
TNS BMRB and You Gov. Another main variable, Google Trends, is from the Google 
Trends data within Scotland based on the keyword ‘Alex Salmond’. For the purposes 
of a robustness check, the Google Trends data of the key word ‘SNP’, closely related 
to the second main variable, is adopted as the control variable. 
 
2.3.2 Rational Regime shifts, Less Clear Information and No ‘Yes’ Momentum  
We first use a Markov Switching (MS) model to test whether the dynamics of 
Potential Yes Votes structurally changed between August 2013 and August 2014. If 
the mean values of the Potential Yes Votes switch over periods, this behaviour can be 
treated as a ‘regime switch’, which can be modelled by a Markov regime switching 
model proposed by Hamilton (1989, 1990). 
 
We first assume that a regime switch of the ‘Potential Yes Votes’ is caused by some 
unobserved variable, St, which measures the states of the world and follows a Markov 
process. Then we can test whether the Potential Yes Votes can be split into 2 regimes, 
i.e., the Potential Yes Votes at time t is in regime 0 if Si = 0 and in regime 1 if Si = 1. If 
the regime switch is preceded by some specific events, e.g., the rejection of a potential 
currency union in February 2014, we can conclude that the dynamics of the Potential 
Yes Votes have structurally changed since this event. 
 
Our MS(2) estimation model can be expressed as:  
 
Yt = μSi + φXSi,t + εSi ,t,             (1) 
where Yt represents Potential Yes Votes, μ is the constant term, and is regime 
dependent. Xt measures the Google Trends, and the error term εt  N(0, σ2 ).  
In our model, the constant, Google Trends, and error term switch between regime 0 
and regime 1. Here, P(0|0) is defined as the probability of the ‘Potential Yes Votes’ 
remaining in regime 0 in week t+1 if it was in regime 0 in week t. The main findings 
are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
 
Based on our analysis, we are able to separate the behaviour of the ‘Potential Yes 
Votes’ into two regimes: Regime 0 spanned from 25th August 2013 to 8th March 2014; 
and Regime 1 was from 16
th
 March 2014 to 16
th
 August 2014.  
 
The markov model estimates indicate that there was about a 96.5% possibility that the 
Potential Yes Votes would stay in regime 0 with a constant of 31.9%. However, some 
specific events might have triggered a potentially unlikely regime change. The regime 
switch happened during the week of 9
th
 -15
th
 March 2014, about four weeks after the 
rejection of the continuation of the sterling zone post-independence by George 
Osborne in February 2014. There was a 4.3% increase, from 31.9% to 36.2%, in the 
constant of Potential Yes Votes from Regime 0 to Regime 1.  
 
Table 1: Effects of Google Trends on Potential Yes Votes in a MS(2) Model 
Potential Yes Votes Coefficient Std Error t-value t-prob 
Constant(0) 31.9161 0.4010 79.6000 0.0000 
Constant(1)  36.1931 0.2266 160.0000 0.0000 
Google Trends (0) 0.0821 0.0253 3.2500 0.0020 
Google Trends (1) 0.0109 0.0076 1.4400 0.1580 
σ(0) 1.0121 0.1380 7.3400  0.0000 
σ(1) 0.6352 0.0964 6.5900 0.0000 
P(0|0) 0.9649 0.0345 28.0000 0.0000 
 Note: The coefficients are significant if their values are bold.      
 
Figure 1: Regime Changes of Potential Yes Votes                  
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Based on the estimation results and the testing criteria on rationality, we can conclude 
as follows: the currency-related debates in February and March caused a regime 
change and a 4.3% increase in ‘Potential Yes Votes’. In other words, we predict that 
4.3% swing voters, after some consideration, seem to have moved to a ‘Yes’ vote in 
the referendum because of the currency related debates. 
 
However, the effects of Google Trends on ‘Potential Yes Votes’ became insignificant 
(P-value 0.16) after 15
th
 March 2014. Based on the testing criteria on clear 
information, voters in the Scottish referendum encountered difficulties in finding 
enough clear information to justify a decision to vote ‘Yes’.  
 
Furthermore, according to related criteria, there was no ‘Yes’ momentum based on 
information search results after 16
th
 March 2014. There were significant and positive 
effects of Google Trends on Potential Yes Votes (0.0821) before 15
th
 March 2014. 
After that time the positive effects became much smaller (0.0109) and insignificant.  
 
 
2.3.3 Emotion-Driven Yes Votes after the Rejection of Currency Union 
The main purpose of this section is to find whether emotion or rationality mattered in 
the decision-making process of voters during the referendum process. To do this we 
adopt a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model to analyse the effects of emotion and 
rationality on ‘Potential Yes Votes’ between 16th March and 16th August of 2014.  
 
A Vector autoregressive model (VAR) is a multivariate regression model with more 
than one dependent variable. The model is flexible and able to incorporate more 
information than traditional univariate regression models. This paper adopts a VAR 
model setup similar to Brooks and Tsolacos (1999) and Vozlyublennaia (2014).  
 
In our case, we analyse the main variables, i.e., the Potential Yes Votes, and Google 
Trends in a bivariate VAR, where we denote them Yt and Xt respectively. The current 
values of the two variables depend on the values of both variables during the previous 
4 weeks, and error terms, can be expressed as follows: 
Yt = μY +α11 Yt-1 +· · ·+α14 Yt-4+β11Xt-1+· · ·+β14Xt-4+εY,t,                   (2) 
Xt = μX +α21 Yt-1 +· · ·+α24 Yt-4+β21Xt-1+· · ·+β24Xt-4+εX,t,                   (3) 
where εY,t and εX,t are white noise disturbance terms with mean equal to zero. The 
estimation results of equation (2), most related to Potential Yes Votes, are listed in 
Table 2. 
 
 
 Table 2: Estimation Results: Equation for Potential Yes Votes in a VAR model 
 
Potential Yes Votes at week t Coefficient Std Error t-value t-prob 
Constant 2.6290 2.4880 1.0600 0.3074 
Google Trends at t-1 0.0109 0.0027 4.0800 0.0010 
Google Trends at t-2 0.0034 0.0070 0.4870 0.6330 
Google Trends at t-3 -0.0007 0.0071 -0.0973 0.9238 
Google Trends at t-4 0.0082 0.0064 1.2700 0.2241 
Potential Yes Votes at t-1  1.3789 0.2388 5.7800  0.0000 
Potential Yes Votes at t-2 -0.2933 0.4140 -0.7090 0.4895 
Potential Yes Votes at t-3 -0.5640 0.4100  -1.3800 0.1891 
Potential Yes Votes at t-4 0.3954 0.2367 1.6700 0.1154 
 Note: The significant coefficients are denoted in bold.   
  
Using the VAR based approach we find that the effects of Google Trends on Potential 
‘Yes’ Votes were significant only within one week. From the testing criteria on 
emotion or rationality, our results suggest that, after the rejection of the potential 
currency union in February 2014, the information-related Yes votes were driven by 
short-term emotion rather than long-term rationality, which also supports our findings 
in the last section that the effects of the Google Trends variable in the second regime 
were not significant. Our results are robust to the inclusion of the Google search 
volume of the key term ‘SNP’. 
 
 
2.3.4 Projection of Referendum Results 
Following the empirical tests and analysis in the previous sections, we project the 
final voting results of the approaching Scottish Referendum in this section. It is not an 
easy task to predict the results of the Scottish Referendum. Even the main polling 
companies were highly divergent on the opinions of the Scottish electorate. Based on 
our calculation of opinion polling results between 25
th
 January and 16
th
 August 2014, 
the average potential ‘Yes’ supporting rate from results of ICM, Panel base and 
Survation were 4.9% higher than from TNS BMRB, You Gov and Dipso Mori. 
Therefore, it is worth projecting the voting results from a different approach. 
 
Our projection is based on the VAR model in section 2.3.2 and the procedures of 
Doornik and Hendry (2013). We first perform dynamic forecasts for the next 8 weeks 
with error variance only. We project that, based on available information until 16 
August 2014, the ‘Yes’ side would get 42.8% of the total vote. And there was 90% 
chance that the ‘Yes’ campaign would get 41.9%-43.7% of the votes. The projection is 
illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
However, we have to consider the uncertain situations in case unplanned events 
happened between late August and mid-September 2014. Therefore, we perform 
dynamic forecasts with consideration of parameter uncertainty. In the latter case, we 
project that that there was a 90% chance that the percentage of votes for independence 
was 38.0%-47.7%.  
 
In summary, based on weekly information on voting intention and information 
demand until 16
th
 August 2014, this section offers two types of dynamic projections, 
considering error variance and parameter uncertainty, respectively. In both cases, the 
projection for final ‘Yes’ voting results was less than 50%, which indicate that 
Scotland would remain in the UK. Nevertheless, the result is subject to further 
examination considering the information available in the last month before 
referendum.  
 
Figure 2: Forecasts of ‘Yes’ Votes 
Forecasts Polling Result 
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       Note: The error fans in the figure are defined with a 90% confidence interval.          
 
3. The Momentous Month before the Referendum: An 
Examination 
This section offers a unique examination of the twists and turns in the last month of 
the independence referendum using a daily data base, attributable to the availability of 
more frequent polling publications and daily Google search volume of several 
‘Yes’-related items. The data-base contains new information to identify the events and 
their short-term impact within a week, and analyse the daily dynamics of voting 
intention and information demand, which is not possible with a weekly data set. 
 
Accordingly, this section specifies key events, updates previous projection results, 
based on new weekly information, and provides an innovative analysis of voting 
intentions, information demand, and key events with a newly constructed daily 
Google indicator. To be specific, our analysis based on daily data offers a detailed 
examination of the effects of key events on the referendum campaign and a thorough 
explanation why there was a jump in ‘Yes’ support from 37%, the average polling 
result of main pollsters on 9th August 2014, to 45%. 
 
3.1 Key Events between Mid-August and Mid-September 2014 
This section summarizes the key events that happened in the last month before the 
referendum in Table 3. The effects of the events on voters’ information search 
behaviour and voting intention are analysed in Section 3.3. 
 
Table 3: Key Events between Mid-August and Mid-September 2014 
 
Time Events Dummy 
25 Aug. 2014 Broadcast of Scotland Decides: Salmond versus Darling D0825 
5-6 Sep. 2014 You Gov conducted and published the result of a poll 
indicating that ‘Yes’ lead ‘No’ for the first time in 2014. 
D0905 
11 Sep. 2014 Broadcast of Scotland Decides: The Big, Big Debate D0911 
15-16 Sep. 2014 BBC's News Night Broadcast of Cameron’s willingness 
of more devolution powers, and publication of the Vow 
by the three main unionist parties in the Daily Record 
D0915 
 
3.2 Updated Projection Results 
This section updates the previous projection on ‘Yes’ votes with the information 
available until 13 September 2014, 5 days before the referendum. The events related 
to more devolution powers are not included in the above analysis for the following 
reasons: Firstly, the events and the referendum happened in the same week, which 
made the projection based on a weekly data set statistically impossible (using daily 
data we can, in the next sub-section, analyse actual events in the week before the 
referendum). Secondly, and more importantly, we would like to establish whether our 
projection results are robust to the unexpected events that happened in the week of the 
referendum. 
 
With the available information until 13 September 2014, we project that the ‘Yes’ side 
would get 45.0% votes. There was a 90% chance that the ‘Yes’ campaign would get 
44.8%- 45.2% of the votes. However, if unplanned events happened in the last few 
days before the referendum, we project that that there was a 90% chance that the 
percentage of votes for independence was 44.6%-45.4%. In summary, with updated 
weekly information, we get very precise projections on the final voting results using 
solely ex ante information (that is information available at the time and not in any 
way altered ex post) 
 
3.3 Examination of the Referendum with an Innovative Daily Google Indicator 
With an innovative indicator measuring daily information search activities of  
referendum voters, this section examines the interactions between information 
demand and voting intention in more detail. At the same time, it measures the effects 
of the events on the two variables between 7
 
August and 16 September 2014. 
Furthermore, we answer the question as to why there was a sharp increase in ‘Yes’ 
support in the last month. The frequent publications of the polling results and 
availability of recent daily Google Trends data permit us to conduct a more detailed 
analysis. 
 
The daily Google Indicator is based on the daily Google search volume of the three 
most ‘Yes’-related items within Scotland, i.e., ‘Alex Salmond’, ‘SNP’ and ‘Scottish 
Referendum’. The key estimation results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Estimation Results of Daily Movements in a VAR model 
 
Effects on Potential Yes Votes at day t 
 Coefficient Std Error t-value t-prob 
Potential Yes Votes at t-1 1.6016 0.1124 14.200 0.0000 
Potential Yes Votes at t-2 -0.5984 0.1131 -5.2900 0.0000 
‘Yes’ Search Indicator at t-4 -0.0023 0.0006 -3.64 0.0013 
D0905 0.1157 0.0528 2.19 0.0386 
Effects on ‘Yes’ Search Indicator at day t 
Potential Yes Votes at t-1 -17.11 6.3550 -2.6900 0.0127 
Potential Yes Votes at t-4 22.0566 6.753  3.2700 0.0033 
‘Yes’ Search Indicator at t-1 0.5791 0.1285 4.5100 0.0001 
‘Yes’ Search Indicator at t-2 -0.2547 0.1306 -1.9500 0.0629 
D0825 21.6201 6.4340 3.3600 0.0026 
D0911 13.2757 6.6680 1.9900 0.0580 
D0915 26.3178 7.3290 3.5900 0.0015 
 Note: All the coefficients in the table are significant.   
 
The key findings are listed as follows. With respect to key events, the You Gov 
polling shock (D0905) did have significant and positive effects on ‘Yes’ votes, but no 
effects on the information search activities. However, all other events, i.e., the debates 
and the Vow, had no significant effects on the final voting results, although they 
matter to the search indicators. 
 
The ‘Yes’ Search Indicator had negative effects on the ‘Yes’ votes, which means that 
the more information people were searching, the less likely they would vote ‘Yes’. 
 
Noticeably, the Potential Yes Votes had significant short-term effects on the final ‘Yes’ 
votes. To be specific, the combined effects of a 1% increase in ‘Yes’ supporters on day 
t-1 and t-2 is around 1% increase in ‘Yes’ votes. The finding means that the grassroots 
‘Yes’ supporters managed to persuade many swing votes during the last month, which 
seems to reflect the ‘Yes’ side’s strength in terms of local mobilisation. 
 
In sum, the results in this section indicate that most key events in the last month 
before the referendum failed to affect the final voting results and that the key factor 
shifting the ’Yes’ Vote to 45% was exisiting ’Yes’ Campaigners persuading swing 
voters to vote ‘Yes’. However, our results also show that if swing voters had relied 
purely on referendum-related information on Google, they were unlikely to vote 
‘Yes’. 
 
4. Summary 
It is not a straightforward task to unravel the issues underpinning the Scottish 
referendum result: the event was intertwined with emotion and rationality, planned 
and unplanned events, etc. In this paper using the big data of Google Trends and 
advanced econometric methods, we are able to show a distinctive picture of the 
Scottish referendum from that provided by traditional approaches. 
 
With a weekly data set between 25 August 2013 and 16 August 2014, we demonstrate 
that currency was the key issue during the referendum campaign period which 
changed the whole structure of voters’ opinion and attributed a 4.3% increase in ‘Yes’ 
votes. However, between 16
th
 March and 16
th
 August 2014, there was not enough 
clear information for potential ‘Yes’ voters who finally cast their votes driven by 
short-term emotion. Furthermore, there was no significant information-related ‘Yes’ 
momentum and the ‘No’ side indeed prevailed. The projection of final ‘Yes’ voting 
results was just at targeted, about 45% 
 
With a daily data set of polling results and an innovative Google indicator, we also 
provide a detailed examination on the key events and the ‘Yes’ support jump in the 
final month before the referendum. The broadcasts of several debates and the Vow by 
three main UK party leaders actually had no direct effects on the voting results and 
indeed swing voters tended to vote ‘No’ after searching referendum-related 
information from Google.  
 
Although innovative our information-demand-based big data approach is subject to 
further improvements and refinement in terms of further tests and examination. 
However, we believe this is an important first step in building a well-functioning 
real-time information indicator measuring society’s voting intentions. 
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